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BOOK REVIEW
FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS' DESIGN. Written by Raoul Berger, University of
Oklahoma Press, 1987. Pp. 223, $16.95 (hardback).
REVIEWED BY JEREMY M. MILLER
This is not just one more condemnatory book review of the em-
inent Raoul Berger's latest book. Liberals have supplied enough of
those.' Instead, the following review is by one of ostensibly the same
political leaning, a conservative. Moreover, whatever one's philos-
ophy, he must be impressed by Berger's historical research and lu-
cidity of style.
Professor Berger is, if not the founder, then still the leading force
behind the jurisprudential philosophy known as "strict construc-
tionism" or "original intention." Strict constructionism commands
judges to strictly or literally interpret/construe the written law. Orig-
inal intent binds judges to the supreme law, the Constitution. In
interpreting it, they should rely not upon personal feelings, concepts
of fairness, sociology, etc. but rather upon only the original inten-
tion of the framers of that great document.
Berger traces the historical roots of original intention to the re-
cesses of English legal history. 2 The search for original intent, he
writes, is the only acceptable function of judges. Otherwise, they
have "uncurbed power," 3 i.e., they have "usurped" 4 another's role.
Chapter Eight examines just such a usurpation by the Supreme
Court of the United States. Mr. Berger argues that municipal mass
transit is in no way interstate commerce, 5 and it should therefore
not be subjected to the "federal minimum wages and hours stand-
* Professor, Western State University College of Law. B.A. Yale, B.S.C.I. MERU (Switzerland),
J.D. Tulane, LL.M. University of Pennsylvania.
See, e.g., Tushnet, Book Review, 73 A.B.A. J. 93 (1987).
2 R. BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FouNDERs' DESIGN 194 (1987).
3 Id. at 186.
4 Id.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8: "The Congress shall have Power... [t]o regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes ......
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ards. ' 6 The Supreme Court, concludes Berger, took the wrong
course.
7
The plethora of that Court's usurpations have denigrated the
Constitution to mean "only what a changing body of Justices chooses
at any giyen moment to have it mean," and hence "a flimsy bulwark
of our liberties." 8 The only way to preserve our freedoms is by
correct and responsible adjudication on the part of all judges, par-
ticularly those on the Supreme Court. Berger concludes, "the end
and object of constitutional construction is the discovery of the in-
tention of those persons who formulated the instrument.' ' 9
In essence, strict constructionism and original intention are but
the latest expression of Austinian jurisprudence, or positivism. John
Austin defined law as (only) the command of a sovereign enforced
by sanction.10 That command, for our present purposes, is the Con-
stitution.
Austin's positivism took analytic jurisprudential form in the phi-
losophy of Goodhart. Goodhart postulated that case law could be
made applicable to future cases by a simple process of paring the
case down to its essence, its ratio decidendi or precedent."
However, both Austin's historical positivism and Goodhart's an-
alytic positivism have glaring flaws. Austin's positivism lacks expres-
sion of the notion that, when push comes to shove, the people may
have more power than the sovereign.' 2 Further, people choose to
obey law even without actual sanction. Kelsen believed such obe-
dience results from the "threat" of sanction rather than the actual
sanction itself.' 3
6 Berger, supra note 2, at 164.
7 Id. at 120; see also Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528
(1985).
1 Berger, supra note 2, at 188.
9 Id. at 201.
See generally J. AustiN, Lectures on Jurisprudence (5th ed, 1885).
See generally Goodhart, Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 40 Yale L.J. 161
(1930).
, Thus reasoned H.L.A. Hart when formulating his "rule of recognition." See generally H.L.A.
HART, TnE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961).
11 See generally H. IKELSEN, GENE-RAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE (1945).
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The Framers, whom Raoul Berger proffers to parrot, also re-
jected this view of law. Instead, they thought that law must be value-
based. Foremost of these values is liberty. Thus, they formulated
a limited government designed to protect the liberty value of the
citizenry. The Framers perceived unbridled government as a threat
to individual liberty. The religious, intellectual, and economic per-
secutions of their forefathers provided the Framers' motivating force.
Therefore, our government was trifurcated, the presidency and all
offices were limited, and a Bill of Rights was soon incorporated. 14
The error in Austinian philosophy has been illustrated repeatedly:
in Nazi Germany, in Cambodia, in Stalin's Russia, and in our own
internment of Japanese-Americans during World War II. Authority
must be limited by liberty and equity. The Framers, recognizing such
necessity, limited governmental authority. Amendment I protects lib-
erty, amendment IV protects the dignity of the home, and amend-
ment V and VI protect citizens' equality before the law. Each clause,
as well as the entire structure of the Constitution, protects these
human values.
The Framers called their philosophy "natural law."S Natural law
has been a long-lived legal philosophy whose proponents have in-
cluded: Jefferson, 16 Madison, 17 Montesquieu, 8 Locke,19 Rousseau,"
Thomas Aquinas, 21 and Aristotle.22 Can an intangible concept such
as a philosophy or a value be subject to strict construction? Certainly
our government cannot destroy liberty. That is an original intent.
But were all the permutations, combinations, and compromises in
liberty laid out by the founders? Of course not.
Liberty unbridled begets anarchy. Liberty almost unbridled de-
stroys another great legal value, equality.23 Balancing liberty against
14 Rusin, To Form a More Perfect Union, 89 HAv. MAG. 30, 38-39 (May-June 1987).
" See generally T. JEFFERSON, THE PORTABLE THOMAS JEFFERSON (1975).
,6 Id. at 21, 251-53, 292, 320, 425, 564-65.
,7 See generally THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 279 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
1B See generally B. MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRT OF LAWS (1878).
' See generally J. LOCKE, ON Crivr GOVERNMENT, Two TREATISES (1965).
See generally J. ROuSsEAu, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (1978).
21 See generally T. AQutNS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA (1960).
See generally ARISTOTLE, TnE POLITICS (1975).
See generally, I A. DE TOCQuEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 279 (1945).
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equality and authority is no simple task. Fundamentally, it requires
deep feelings of fairness and careful attention to the twin needs of
neither destroying the individual's autonomy nor destroying that
which preserves individual autonomy, the government's authority.
I, too, am a strict constructionist. I, too, believe in original in-
tent. But such is not a set of written rules to be discovered in the
private libraries of the Framers, nor in the archaic yellowed script
of a document the average American can read only with great dif-
ficulty. Rather that original intent is a balancing process involving
different values, never forgetting the greatest of all legal values,
liberty.
An analogy may help to illustrate the terrible fallacy of Berger's
view. The ancient medical practices of the Greeks included many
things we now know to be damaging. The great medical oath, that
of Hippocrates, at that time commanded that doctors follow the
best practices in Greek medicine. Were we to strictly construe that
oath, modern doctors would be required to do bloodletting and ig-
nore penicillin.
Berger's strict construction is superficial. Hippocrates' intent was
to heal. That intent is and will continue to be fundamental to med-
icine. Additionally, doctors are to serve their patients and honor
(not abuse) their trust. Hippocrates' oath has been remembered be-
cause of its universality. Hippocrates, were he alive, would be aghast
to have his teachings taken literally. Such was not his original in-
tention. Similarly, the United States Constitution has survived be-
cause of its universality in expressing not the idiosyncracies of
Eighteenth Century America, but instead in its expressing perennial
legal values.
Although at times Berger's Janguage might have us hope he is
more than a literalist, the pessimistic conclusion seems more ap-
propriate. He does talk of liberty, 24 but he is far more pre-occupied
with states' rights. 25 Berger rightly argues that our system was to be
See generally Berger, supra note 2, at 56.
21 Id. at 20, 24, 32.
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one of dual sovereignty, 26 i.e., one in which the states have sov-
ereignty over some things and the national government over others,
but he misses the mark by going no deeper. The purpose of states'
rights was to protect the individual by limiting central power.
In an era in which most states and many corporations are more
powerful then the original United States, how can Berger argue that
limitations must not be placed on the states or businesses themselves?
Further, did not the Fourteenth and other Civil War amendments
change the game entirely, as they are expressly applicable to the
states? 27 The due process requirement was, even then, a catch-all.
The evolution of selective incorporation (of the Bill of Rights to the
states) is neither radical ... nor new.28 Berger seems somehow to
disagree.
29
It seems the hope of the erudite Berger is that the high court
stop its usurpation and that all future changes be thrown open to
the populace.30 He writes, "if the Constitution stands in need of
revision, let the people amend it in accordance with Article V. '"31
Although I will not disagree with that sentiment, Berger's notion
of original intent trivializes a Constitution designed to protect liberty
into an Eighteenth-Century strait-jacket.
6 Id. at 48, 54.
2 In pertinent part, the Fourteenth Amendment reads:
... No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges and
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws ... [emphasis added]
21 See, e.g., Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897) (defining the Fourteenth
Amendment's due process clause as including the Fifth Amendment's just compensation clause); Gitlow
v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (incorporating the First Amendment free speech clause into Four-
teenth Amendment due process); Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (incorporating Fifth
Amendment double jeopardy). The above gives a sampling of the so-called "selective incorporation"
cases. The fact that such process began in the late 1800's clearly refutes Berger's implicit argument
that judicial usurpation is a new creature. More fundamentally, it lends credence to the notion that
he has missed the point altogether. That is, the Fourteenth Amendment unarguably diminished states'
rights at least in the area of individual liberties. When Berger calls for a formal constitutional amend-
ment process, infra note 31, he has likely missed the mark badly as that has already occurred over
a century ago!
9 Berger, supra note 2, at 158-63.
Id. at 179-81.
31 Id. at 189.
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